

The loss of electoral competitiveness of opposition parties: A premonition of the transformation of the party system in Mexico?

(Work in progress)

Introduction

It is a disturbing fact that opposition political parties in Mexico are increasingly losing competitiveness in federal, state and local elections. Should this trend continue or even deepen, this loss of competitiveness could cause, in the long term, the transformation of the party system in this country and allow that PRI becomes once again the dominant party, which would not face serious contenders in future electoral processes. Furthermore, this continuing electoral tendency could affect other dimensions of democracy in Mexico, such as horizontal accountability, responsiveness and rule of law, in other words, it could seriously undermine the quality of democracy and threaten this country with the return of authoritarianism.

If we define in empirical terms a democratic regime as one in which legislative and executive authorities are chosen through direct or indirect free and competed elections, we implicitly consider electoral *competition* as a crucial element of this kind of political regime, without which we could not understand and define accurately its nature. Indeed, electoral competition for power has been regarded as a *necessary* condition and distinctive sign of modern democracy, as well as an important source of legitimacy of any democratic regime (Méndez de Hoyos, 2003: 27-28). Furthermore, while Giovanni Sartori (2000: 260-261) (cited by Méndez de Hoyos, 2003: 39) considers electoral *competition* as a framework or a group of rules of the game, he deems *competitiveness* as a concrete state of such a game, and argues that this concept should be considered a feature of *competition*, which, once in practice, protects the political rights of citizens.

That is why it is so disquieting that while the constitutional and legal conditions for electoral competition have improved throughout the country since 1996, the performance of PAN and PRD, the main challengers of PRI, has worsened, generally speaking, in recent federal and local elections.

This circumstance has emboldened PRI supporters to diffuse once again an image of invincibility of this party, as in the old times of the authoritarian regime, which might not be completely inaccurate, because as long as PAN and PRD (the main challengers of PRI), for any or other reason, continue failing to keep electoral competitiveness, PRI won't face in the near future any serious threat to its dominance in the Mexican political realm.

This state of affairs constitutes, perhaps, the most serious contemporary obstruction for the improvement of the quality of democracy in Mexico, since the absence of electorally competitive political parties could plausibly erode responsiveness from and horizontal accountability within the Mexican government, plus reducing political freedom and equality for the citizenry. In other words, the aforementioned dimensions of the quality of democracy are constantly endangered by the continuous weakening of electoral competitiveness of opposition parties in Mexico.

This circumstance deserves to be thoroughly studied, so that we might be able to adequately understand which policies could forcefully promote quality electoral competition among Mexican political parties and thus improve the quality of democracy in this country.

That is why the primary purpose of the following research is to ascertain the main reasons with regard to the electoral weariness of opposition political parties in Mexico. The results of this research might be of particular interest for active politicians of Mexican opposition parties who are seeking ways to improve the electoral performance of their own parties and the quality of Mexico's democracy.

General Theories of Electoral Behavior

Due to successive and successful political reforms, Mexico has become a truly electoral democracy, a regime in which the rotation of legislative and executive authorities is carried out through free, relatively fair and competed elections. Arguably, since 1997, Mexicans enjoy free, fair and competed elections, parties and candidates enjoy generous funding and access to the media in order to put into effect their electoral campaigns, the media and civil society are comparatively freer to express their opinions in the public sphere, votes are duly scrutinized and computed, so in this new and emerging context, theories of electoral

behavior generated in consolidated democracies turn out to be crucial points of reference in order to comprehend and explain the outcome of elections in a nascent democratic system such as Mexico.

a) Rational choice theory

Let us start the narration of theories of electoral behavior with rational choice theory. This theory assumes that every human being is an egoist rational thinker who only intends to maximize their material benefits and reduce their costs in all their actions as much as possible, so, according to this argument, this attitude is also reflected in electoral behavior. In this sense, rational choice theory focuses on what happens at the cognitive level of an individual, on how a person interprets a particular electoral choice from a rational egoist perspective, in this way this theory interprets human actions always from within a particular benchmark, including, of course, electoral choices. This theory can explain the electoral behavior of many Mexican citizens, especially those controlled by patronage and clientelism, and of those who desperately want a share in the rent seeking arrangement of the Mexican political system.

b) The impact of the mass media

On the other hand, the theory that asserts that citizens form their public opinion and electoral preferences mainly through the mass media is worth considering for the Mexican case. The fact is that the impact of the Mexican mass media on electoral behavior has been extensively researched and discussed in recent academic literature¹. It is widely believed in Mexico that the broadcasting media release information strategically in order to further their own political and economic interests and that they are manipulated through patronage by the federal, state and even municipal governments. Different scholars ascertain that the broadcasting media impacts considerably electoral behavior in Mexico, since they constitute the main source of political information of a large part of Mexicans who are illiterate and who literally see the “political” world through the lenses of this kind of media.

¹ See for example Betancourt (2013)

The fact that the ownership of the broadcasting media in Mexico is concentrated in relatively few hands increases the understandable questioning of their political manipulation. Chappell H. Lawson and other scholars have argued that more and better competition, plurality and diversity in the ownership of Mexican broadcasting media could also advance the electoral freedom of Mexicans, since these new conditions could better secure access to and diffusion of quality political information in the public sphere.

Last year in Mexico the social movement “*Yo soy 132*” explicitly challenged the status quo in broadcasting media and demanded more plurality, diversity, access, competition, as well as a fairer and more critical use of these media in the public sphere. “*Yo soy 132*” accused Mexican broadcasting media of grotesquely manipulating information in order to advance the economic and political interests of the Mexican power elite and of constituting the most serious obstacle for the democratic development of Mexico. In few words, it accused the broadcasting media of inherently supporting an authoritarian regime in this country. This critique may be valid and accurate. Despite the merits of this judgment and the fact that it is undeniable that the broadcasting media in Mexico impacts largely the electoral behavior of Mexicans, this impact is not without reserve, since there are several factors that could minimize, neutralize or even wipe it out in the Mexican public sphere.

Mexicans nowadays enjoy much more diversity and plurality of mass media outlets than thirty years ago, even in broadcasting media, especially radio; there is a relatively sound and sane competition in printing media and there are also better professional standards in news reporting, generally speaking, in this kind of media. Additionally, Mexicans enjoy free access to internet and freedom of expression within this outlet and in the Mexican public sphere in order to protest and make their voices be heard. All these conditions meaningfully and arguably diminish the impact of Mexican broadcasting media in electoral behavior.

c) Social environment

Scholars who support this theory believe that electoral preferences are determined by the social background of citizens, that this background decisively shapes these preferences. Despite the fact that there are multiple cases that challenge this particular explanation of electoral behavior, it is also true that there are electoral cleavages in Mexico where citizens, because of their specific social context, tend to vote more for a concrete party than for any other. This fact may prove that the social environment impacts considerably electoral behavior in Mexico, nevertheless, social ambiance may not be an absolute factor either, since, given the right conditions, Mexican voters can and have indeed transformed their electoral preferences despite the electoral tendency of their own social living conditions.

d) Social network

The theory of social network argues that citizens tend to form their electoral preferences through proactively taking part of specific social networks which are beyond concrete social status or environment. This theory sustains that the human person remains free to choose their social interaction, despite their social and economic background, and depending on the exercise of this freedom, electoral preferences tend to be formed.

This theory may be able to explain the electoral behavior of many young citizens in Mexico and across the world, whom have challenged conventions and unpredictably vote for a party different, as consequence of their social environment, from their expected one. This situation may prove that this kind of citizens tend to build their electoral preferences more through social networking than by experiencing their social environment, listening to the mass media or enduring patronized or clientelist strategies.

e) Patronage and Clientelism

Clientelism and patronage could explain the electoral behavior of an important segment of Mexicans, especially the functioning of the most ill-fortuned ones. In this paper, I argue that the poor economic, cultural, social and political conditions of vulnerable Mexicans DO bolster the practice of electoral clientelism and political patronage. For if this people were economically independent, culturally and socially developed, and enjoyed

better legal conditions to choose their political authorities from free and fair electoral competitions, electoral clientelism and political patronage would be substantively attenuated, especially if the information environment in Mexico improved considerably. Arguably, all these ideal conditions could advance the necessary and sufficient freedom of citizens in order to beat clientelist and patronized strategies designed to keep them in check or even repress them. It is a reality that electoral clientelism is widely practiced by the main Mexican political parties, and arguably this social phenomenon derives from a deep social and economic divide within this country, which subjects many Mexicans to the discretionary power of mighty people (the patrons), who in order to gain political loyalty strategically restrict the access to resources. This pattern of conduct is definitely a trace of authoritarian culture, which also subverts democratic principles, advances top down hierarchical relationships and constrains the necessary political freedom of citizens for a democratic form of government.

Which of all these theories can explain better the outcome of the most recent state electoral contests in Mexico? In order to obtain a better perspective of the right answer, let us proceed to analyze profoundly, through process tracing, each of the five case studies of the present research paper.

1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

H1. The joint presence of diverse factors (independent variables) became a sufficient (INUS) condition that caused the electoral success or failure of the related parties at the state level in Mexico.

H2. The electoral victories were mainly caused by a rational choice of citizens and positive mass media coverage.

H3. The internal division within the respective parties due to the type of selection of nominees became a necessary condition for their electoral defeat.

H4. The discredit and low performance in government of the respective ruling parties became necessary conditions for their electoral defeat.

H5. The specific quality of nominees became a necessary condition for either the electoral victory or failure of parties at the state level in Mexico.

H6. The sort of clientele strategy practiced by the respective ruling party became a necessary condition for either its electoral success or failure.

H7. A strategy of negative campaign became a necessary condition for the electoral failure of the respective practicing parties at the state level in Mexico.

H8. A good party organization became a necessary condition for the electoral triumph of the respective parties at the state level in Mexico.

2. Methodology

The author of this paper has selected five case studies for the sake of getting causal leverage of these phenomena. All these case studies are state elections, which took place in the course of President Calderón's *sexenio*, so as to renew governorships in five Mexican states: *Yucatán* in 2007, *Zacatecas* in 2010, *Sinaloa* in 2010, *Oaxaca* in 2010 and *Mexico State* in 2011.

In each case study, the present paper will critically examine the following independent variables so as to elucidate the causes of the electoral results in these five states: a) internal division within opposition parties, b) performance of local ruling parties, c) type of selection of nominees within leading political parties, d) discredit of parties at the corresponding state level due to corruption scandals, e) clientele strategies in order to win the related local elections, f) the quality of nominees for the associated state elections, g) quality of party organization at the state level and h) specific campaign strategies with a view to win the corresponding state elections.

For each case study this paper will intend to decipher the concrete combination of independent variables that became either necessary or sufficient conditions for the electoral triumph of the PRI or the opposition parties in the corresponding states. The principal hypotheses of the present paper are the following ones:

Consequently, this paper will gather qualitative and quantitative evidence in order to confirm or falsify the previously mentioned hypotheses in each of the five case studies of the present research. Quantitative data will be provided as supporting material for the sake of describing comprehensively the dependent and independent variables that will be studied in the course of this inquiry. Nevertheless, before appraising qualitative and quantitative data, let me outline the theoretical framework which will help us to carry out the analysis of some of the recent state electoral outcomes in Mexico.

3. The case of Yucatán in 2007

a. Electoral performance of PRI, PAN and PRD

The PRI won the state governorship by obtaining 49.12% of votes, followed by the then ruling party PAN, which obtained only 42.39%. PAN was overthrown despite the fact that at the beginning of the electoral race was the favorite to win and despite enjoying the support of the federal government. However, both PRI and PAN were the most competitive parties at the state level while both PRD and CTSY (the coalition that supported Ana Rosa Payán, who deserted from PAN to compete on her own for the governorship) remained far behind with 2.54% and 3.34% of votes respectively.

TABLE OF RESULTS

PAN	PRI	PRD	CTSY	PVEM	PAY	PANAL	ASD	NR	NULL
42.39%	49.12%	2.54%	3.34%	0.40%	0.18%	0.37%	0.16%	0.02%	1.49%

Which combination of independent variables caused these results? We will now proceed to look for causal process observations CPO's (clues) in the following independent variables in order to draw both descriptive and causal inferences between these independent variables and the dependent variable of this piece of research (electoral performance of PRI, PAN and PRD).

b. Internal division within PAN

Perhaps the curse of PAN consisted on remaining in power for two *sexenios*, because, apparently, the main cause of the internal division of PAN consisted in the bitter struggle for power between two internal groups in this party, one commanded by the then President Calderón and the other one aligned to the then president of PAN Manuel Espino and the former President of the Republic *Vicente Fox*. The group of President Felipe Calderón intended to take over all positions of authority within the party as well as the main nominations of the party for external electoral processes, by alienating and even dismissing

all those members of the party who showed any sympathy at all for Manuel Espino and Vicente Fox. This internal policy is correlated to the profound electoral weakening that PAN experienced throughout the *sexenio* of Felipe Calderón.

Since February 2007 hundreds of *panistas* started to withdraw from PAN as consequence of what they called “imposition” of nominees over the party by the closed team of President Felipe Carlos. This situation precisely started to take place in the state of Yucatán. By January 2007 there had been two main contenders for the nomination of this party for the state governorship of *Yucatán*, Xavier Abreu Sierra and Ana Rosa Payán. Abreu Sierra in the end was elected *candidate* of PAN for this governorship in an internal electoral contest, which was charged with serious irregularities like vote buying and coercion, by Ana Rosa Payán and her team. The true was that the winner of this internal contest, Abreu Sierra, had had a closed relationship with President Calderón during the presidential electoral process of 2006 and this fact increased the suspicion that the federal government unduly manipulated resources in order to cause the internal electoral triumph of Abreu Sierra over Payán.

In the end, Payán withdrew from PAN and her nomination for the state governorship was supported by small parties such as *Nueva Alianza*, *Convergencia* and *Partido del Trabajo*, however, Payán remained far behind the main contenders in Yucatán, PRI’s candidate Ivonne Ortega Pacheco and PAN’s nominee Xavier Abreu Sierra, and even the nominee from PRD, Héctor Herrera Cholo.

c. Performance of PAN as a state ruling party

It seems that PAN was performing satisfactorily as state ruling party in Yucatán, since we could not trace in our fieldwork particular serious complaints from *yucatecos* about the manner this party was running the economy or the fashion it was managing the state public administration, neither we could trace meaningful news reports that had singled out its poor reputation or ill administration as state ruling party.

d. Type of selection of nominees within PRI and PAN

From the beginning, the strategies of PRI and PAN in order to win the state governorship of *Yucatán* differed completely, while PRI fomented inclusiveness and advanced its unity by respecting the voice of its members in the selection of nominees, PAN apparently dismissed the voice and vote of its members in its internal elections by practicing vote buying and coercion.

e. Discredit of PAN at the state level

The social approval of PAN in *Yucatán* was not seriously damaged before the outcome of the internal electoral process in order to choose the official nominee of the party for the state governorship was known, it was only after this process ended that its prestige was weakened by the internal accusations of corruption, clientelism, patronage and partiality practiced throughout this internal electoral process. Indeed Ana Rosa Payán, the contender defeated, accused President Calderón and his close staff and political operators of having unduly intervened in the internal electoral contest by issuing instructions to *panistas* to unfairly support Xavier Abreu Sierra against Payán through the most despicable political practices that PAN used to criticize from PRI.

f. Clientele strategy of PRI and PAN

From the beginning of the electoral race Ivonne Ortega, the official nominee of PRI, accused PAN of vote buying and coercion, of unfairly using the federal state apparatus in order to make Abreu Sierra win the *Yucatán's* electoral contest, however Xavier Abreu Sierra and PAN also accused Ortega of unfairly receiving public resources from five PRI governors (*Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Estado de México, Campeche and Nuevo León*) in order to use them in a clientele fashion. Ortega acknowledged the support of these governors, but claimed that it was just political, and not reflected in an unfair economic support. All these repeated, serious and mutual accusations make us believe that they were probably true, however, they still remain very difficult to prove. It is fact that the Mexican political system lacks of the right mechanisms that could permit due transparency in the management of public resources, especially at the state and municipal level of government.

g. Quality of nominees for the state governorship from PRI and PAN

It seems that the selection of candidates within PAN through voting assemblies assures the quality of nominees, since in order to win the respective internal electoral contests, candidates have to make the effort of convincing the party bases of their respective districts. On the other hand, each time PAN decides to practice internal democracy in order to select its nominees, the chances it possesses to win the respective elections increases substantially, fact that can be explained by the synergy created by the party base in choosing the respective nominee, which provokes that this base continues its support for this nominee at the external campaign.

The problem in *Yucatán* in 2007 was that Abreu Sierra was selected in a highly questioned internal electoral process, in which accusations of patronage and clientelism were made by the loser pre candidate, Ana Rosa Payán, who claimed that democracy within PAN was severely undermined by these corrupted practices. This fact make us believe that the quality of the *panista* nominee for the state governorship was low, since this context make us infer that he did not win the nomination by his *charisma, sympathy or wide support* of his party comrades, but by being close friend of the then President of Mexico Felipe Calderón.

On the other hand, the *priista* nominee, Ivonne Ortega, did not experience such a great opposition for her candidacy within her party, the *priistas* knew how to content internal conflict by negotiating among themselves their different positions within the party structure, despite not being completely democratic in the selection of their candidate for the *Yucatán* state governorship.

Due to their political experience, the *priistas* usually know how to include all their members in the costs and benefits of the selection of their respective candidates, this was the precisely the case of *Yucatán*, where the *priistas* maintained their party unity and increased their internal *social capital*, which created a synergy among them in order to support their candidate.

h. Campaign strategy of PRI and PAN

PRI took care of the little details of its campaign in *Yucatán* and while preserving their synergy and internal unity, *priistas* also were combative in the public sphere denouncing all the serious irregularities committed by the *panista* regime that they were observing throughout the campaign. However, *priistas* did not practice an unscrupulous negative campaign as *panistas* actually did. The fact was that *panistas* focused more on depicting Ivonne Ortega with the worst possible attributes than on outlining their proposals for *Yucatán* to their potential electorate. In the end, this kind of negative campaign backfired and instead of boosting the popularity of the *panista* nominee, a great part of the *yucateco* electorate found it quite disgusting. On the other hand, *priistas* showed great party discipline by brilliantly coordinating their efforts in order to win the electoral contest, while simultaneously *panistas* were deeply divided and without enough incentives in order to support their nominee in the external electoral contest.



i. The impact of the media on the State Election

It does not seem that the mass media became a decisive factor in the outcome of the *Yucatán's* electoral process, since we could not trace any significant complaints of parties and candidates about the unfair use and news reporting of the state mass media. Besides, a debate between all the contenders for the state governorship was widely broadcasted by the broadcasting media, which contributed to achieve fairer, more balanced, more impartial, more objective and unbiased coverage of electoral campaigns.

The truth is that all competing parties had a fair chance to make their voices be seen and heard through the local broadcasting media, since IFE managed the official time allotted to parties in this kind of media in order to diffuse their proposals to the local electorate. There were not significant complaints on this management, political parties did see their advertisements broadcasted as scheduled by IFE and this fact contributed to the fair use of the mass media throughout the *yucatán's* state election.

4. The case of Sinaloa in 2010

a. Electoral performance of PRI and the Coalition PAN-PRD

DISTRICT			NON REGISTERED NOMINEES	NULLIFIED VOTES	TOTAL
I CHOIX	7,873	7,121	24	356	15,374
II EL FUERTE	26,581	16,279	44	742	43,646
III AHOME	75,793	18,054	159	909	94,915
IV AHOME	60,565	14,978	86	802	76,431
V SINALOA	23,606	16,508	28	753	40,895
VI GUASAVE	34,342	31,529	85	788	66,744
VII GUASAVE	29,099	28,815	69	692	58,675
VIII ANGOSTURA	12,816	12,004	18	243	25,081
IX S. ALVARADO	19,285	15,510	76	433	35,304
X MOCORITO	8,480	13,463	45	395	22,383
XI BADIRAGUATO	3,934	8,477	38	315	12,764
XII CULIACAN	29,628	50,851	318	1,444	82,241
XIII CULIACAN	35,426	53,691	365	1,396	90,878
XIV CULIACAN	23,194	26,834	103	816	50,947
XV NAVOLATO	22,536	32,436	92	759	55,823
XVI COSALA	3,278	3,881	9	202	7,370
XVII ELOTA	7,243	9,152	44	338	16,777
XVIII SAN IGNACIO	4,933	5,589	22	226	10,770
XIX MAZATLAN	63,639	56,374	323	2,470	122, 806
XX MAZATLAN	15,385	15,647	67	769	31,868
XXI CONCORDIA	5,933	7,211	35	267	13,446
XXII EL ROSARIO	12,631	9,136	43	486	22,296
XXIII ESCUINAPA	12,196	11,178	37	359	23,770
XXIV CULIACAN	38,035	50,765	292	1,595	90,687
TOTALES	576,431	515,483	2,422	17,555	1,111, 891
PORCENTAJES	51.84%	46.36%	0.22%	1.58%	100%

Resultados contenidos en las actas de los cómputos distritales celebrados conforme al Art. 182 y 183 de la Ley Electoral del Estado de Sinaloa, el día miércoles 7 de julio de 2010; y sujetos a validación, en la sesión de cómputo estatal a celebrarse el Domingo 11 de Julio de 2010

As we can see in the table above, the coalition between PAN, PRD and Convergencia defeated the coalition between PRI and PVEM by a margin of more than 5% of votes. For the first time in its history after the Mexican revolution, Sinaloa State experienced a rotation of party in government, although the candidate postulated by the winning coalition used to be a *priista* militant, who protested against his former leaders due to the outcome of the internal electoral contest for the PRI nomination for the state governorship. We will now proceed to critically examine the different independent variables that may have caused this electoral outcome.

b. Internal division within PRI.

PRI experienced a serious division in Sinaloa in 2010 because the then Governor Aguilar Padilla supported the mayor of *Culiacán*, Jesús Vizcarra in order to become the official candidate of PRI for the state governorship. The senator Mario López Valdez (*Malova*) protested against this measure, which he considered unfair because six years ago he had to step down his pre candidacy so that Aguilar Padilla could win the internal electoral process and compete for the state governorship. López Valdez considered that it was unfair to lose unjustly his candidacy once again so he decided to seek this nomination from his former political rivals: PAN and PRD. In this case, the *priistas* did not know how to conciliate the interests of the main internal contenders in order to preserve the party unity and their coordination of efforts in order to win the elections.

c. Performance and discredit of PRI as a state ruling party

Throughout the campaign, PAN and PRD continuously make allegations against the government of PRI in Sinaloa, claiming that many problems in this state were due to its long period as a ruling party, so these parties intended to brainwash *sinaloenses* into accepting that only an alternation of ruling party at the state level could end up with their problems. The paradox is that the coalition between PAN and PRD won the state governorship by promoting a notoriously *ex priista* candidate and not by advancing someone from their rank and file, which increases the suspicion that more than its discredit among the people, the real reason of PRI's defeat was its internal division provoked by the

lack of consensus on the right candidate for the state governorship. So it does not look as if the popular discredit of PRI in Sinaloa was particularly notorious as in the case of Oaxaca, though certainly thousands of *sinaloenses* disapproved the performance of PRI in government and the way this party was handling its internal issues, otherwise this party would not have been defeated so harshly in these elections.

d. Type of selection of nominees within PRI and the coalition PAN-PRD

Different political analysts in Mexico claim that all parties became closed and that the different state elections just became a power struggle between party elites with no regard to the people's true interests and representation in power structures. The truth is that the selection of the nominee of the coalition of PAN and PRD was more supported by party elites than by party bases and in the end it was only agreed by the elites of these parties. So the two most important coalitions of Sinaloa in 2010 selected their respective candidates in an oligarchical fashion, however, this type of selection caused more harm and provoked more division in PRI than in the PAN-PRD coalition.

e. Clientele strategy of PRI and of the coalition PAN-PRD

As in the rest of the country, candidates for the state governorship of Sinaloa intended to win popular support by framing and delivering unviable but astounding promises without explaining how they expect to implement them. Their discourse was clientelistic instead of based on viable, clever, creative and ingenious solutions to the most serious problems that the *sinaloenses* did face in that moment. In this sense, we can accuse both the coalition of PRI-PVEM and the coalition of PAN-PRD of having approached elections in a clientelistic fashion, without having intended to persuade citizens of the rational merit of their proposals. So it may not be surprise if we find that both coalitions in Sinaloa grossly based their strategy to win the state elections on clientele promises.

f. Quality of nominees from PRI and the coalition PAN-PRD for the state governorship

The problem in Mexico is that usually the criteria to select candidates are not their abilities, competence, charisma, sympathy and/or actual capacity of winning the elections, but their closed relationship, their loyalty to the party cacique, whether this may be the President of the Republic, a governor or any other powerful politician within the party. These criteria evidently diminishes the quality of candidates since parties are arguably and solely relying on patronized and clientelistic strategies in order to secure electoral triumph, without punctually taking care of other aspects of their candidates that are important in order to amply win elections. This is perhaps what happened to the *priista* candidate in Sinaloa, Jesús Vizcarra. The then governor of Sinaloa, Aguilar Padilla, chose him to win the nomination based mainly on his friendship, but with no concern on his competence, charisma and sympathy, in the end this selection proved to be wrong and in a certain sense catastrophic for PRI.

g. Campaign strategy of PRI and the coalition of PAN-PRD

The pragmatism of the coalition PAN-PRD worked out very well in the end in Sinaloa State. This coalition split up *priistas* with the sole and pragmatic objective of weakening the possibilities of PRI of triumphing in this electoral contest. However, it seems that the Machiavellian strategy of PAN and PRD succeeded by chance, since the *priistas* were somehow slept and did not realize in good time that the opposition intended to profit from its split, otherwise PRI would have caught the plot at the right time and prevented it from happening, as it seems to have happened in Mexico State one year later.

h. The impact of the media on the state election

It does not seem that the mass media became a decisive factor in the local elections of Sinaloa state. As in the case of Yucatán, we could not trace significant complaints of parties and candidates concerning the unfair use and news reporting of the state's mass media. Two debates between the main contenders for the state governorship were widely diffused

by the broadcasting media, which also contributed to achieve a fairer, more balanced, impartial, objective and unbiased coverage of this electoral campaign.

As in the case of Yucatán, the two competing coalitions in Sinaloa enjoyed a relatively fair chance to make their voices be seen and heard through the state's broadcasting media, since IFE also managed the official time, allotted to these coalitions in this kind of media, in order to diffuse their proposals to the Sinaloa's electorate. Additionally, since there were not significant complaints on this management, we can assume that political parties did actually see their advertisements distributed by IFE as scheduled, and this circumstance contributed to the fair and balanced employment of the broadcasting media during the *Yucatán's* state election.

Bibliography

- Alcocer, Jorge V. (2012), "México: El Retorno del PRI", *Periscopio Electoral*, pp. 29-31.
- Bruhn, Kathleen (2003), "Whores and lesbians: political activism, party strategies, and gender quotas in Mexico", *Electoral Studies*, vol. 22, issue 1, pp. 101-119.
- _____. (2010), "Too Much Democracy? Primaries and candidate success in the 2005 Mexican National Elections", *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 52, issue 4, pp. 25 - 52.
- Cansino, César (2011), "México a la deriva. Luces y sombras de nuestro tránsito tardío a la democracia", *Revista IUS*, pp. 285 -294.
- Cornelius, Wayne A, Todd Eisenstadt and Jane Hindley (eds.), *Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 369 pp.
- Dix, Robert H (1989), "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 23-37.
- Emmerich, Gustavo Ernesto (2007), "Las elecciones de 2006 y su impacto sobre la democracia en México", *El Cotidiano*, vol. 22, no. 145, pp. 5 – 15.
- Granados, Otto (2012), "México: Una democracia improductiva", *Periscopio Electoral*, pp. 28-29.
- Greene, Kenneth F (2007), *Why Dominant Parties Lose. Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. xvi, 350.
- Hiskey, Jonathan and Damarys Canache (2005), "The Demise of One – Party Politics in Mexican Municipal Elections", *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, issue 2, pp. 257-284.
- Klesner, Joseph L (2005), "Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico", *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 103 -142.
- Langston, Joy (1998), "Los efectos de la competencia electoral en la selección de candidatos del PRI a la Cámara de Diputados", *Política y Gobierno*, vol. V, no. 2, pp. 459 -500.
- Levy, Daniel C and Kathleen Bruhn (2001), *Mexico: The struggle for democratic development*, London, University of California Press Ltd, 365 pp.
- Lomelí Meillón, Luz (2013), "Competencia Electoral en México. La configuración de un sistema de partidos competitivo", *Espiral. Estudios sobre Estado y Sociedad*, vol. X, no. 28, pp. 87-119.
- Magaloni, Beatriz (2006), *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its Demise in Mexico*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 296 pp.
- Magar, Eric and Vidal Romero (2007), "México: La accidentada consolidación democrática", *Revista de Ciencia Política*, especial volume, pp. 183-204.

- Méndez de Hoyos, Irma (2003), "Competencia y competitividad electoral en México, 1977 – 1997", *Política y Gobierno*, vol. X, no. 1, pp. 139-182.
- Palma, Esperanza (2010), "México: Entre la violencia y la consolidación del sistema de partidos", *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 379-196.
- Ramírez, Carlos (2011), "El 2012 y la encrucijada en México", *Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla*, Año V, No. 27, pp. 279-294.
- Serra, Gilles (2009), "Una lectura crítica de la reforma electoral en México a raíz de la elección de 2006", *Política y Gobierno*, vol. XVI, no. 2, pp. 411 - 427.
- Solt, Frederick (2004), "Electoral Competition, Legislative Pluralism and Institutional Development: Evidence from Mexico's States", *Latin America Research Review*, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 155 - 137.
- Vivero, Igor (2006), *Desafiando al sistema, la izquierda política en México. Evolución organizativa, ideológica y electoral del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (1989-2005)*, México, Porrúa/UAEM, 368 pp.
- Whitehead, Laurence (1996), "Una transición difícil de alcanzar: la lenta desaparición del gobierno del partido dominante en México", *Política y Gobierno*, vol. III, no. 1, pp. 31-59.